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INTRODUCTION
At 19 years old, Cory Boland was prescribed opioid painkillers after a
snowboarding accident left him with two plates and 24 screws in his arm.1
Cory’s mother described him as a “happy-go-lucky guy with a need for
thrills.”2 Yet, the accident changed him, she said.3 As a result of the pain
from the accident, Cory repeatedly refilled his prescriptions—the
beginning of an addiction that he would battle for years.4 Cory’s doctor
suddenly moved away, leaving him with no prescriber for his painkillers.5
Although the pills were gone, his addiction remained.6 As a result, Cory
turned to heroin.7 After 11 years of battling addiction, Cory lost his life to
an opioid overdose.8
Tragically, Cory’s life was one of over 450,000 lives claimed by a
crisis unabated to date—opioid addiction.9 Historically, opioids were
prescribed to terminally ill patients.10 In the 1990s, however,
pharmaceutical companies began aggressive marketing campaigns to
expand the prescription opioid market to a larger and more lucrative group
of patients and illnesses.11 As manufacturers minimized the addictive

Copyright 2022, by NATALIE EARLES.
* The author is grateful to Professor Margaret S. Thomas for her invaluable
guidance and feedback on previous drafts, as well as Brittany W. Flanders and the
editors of the Louisiana Law Review for their thoughtful edits.
1. Karen Boland, A Mother’s Guilt: My Personal Experience with the
Opioid Crisis and What to Do About It, USA TODAY (June 13, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/06/13/prescription-opioidsdepression-accident-addiction-overdose-heroin-column/691348002/
[https://perma.cc/JWT7-3WTU].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Prescription Opioids DrugFacts, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://
www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/prescription-opioids [https://perma.c
c/3Y5A-P32R] (last visited May 22, 2020).
10. Ben Lesser, An Overview of the Opioid Epidemic, DUALDIAGNOSIS.ORG,
https://dualdiagnosis.org/infographics/history-of-the-opioid-epidemic/ [https://per
ma.cc/N2LL-9TZ6] (last updated May 22, 2021).
11. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://
www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https://perma.c
c/C4QH-FSHJ] (last visited May 27, 2020).
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nature of opioids, the volume of prescriptions increased alongside the
rising rates of overdose deaths.12 Today, two million Americans suffer
from opioid addiction.13 To make matters worse, the epidemic’s
devastating effects are felt far beyond individual addicts.14 Nearly 80
babies a day are born with opioid withdrawal symptoms.15 Families of
individuals suffering with opioid addiction are exhausting their resources
on rehabilitation efforts.16 In addition, the annual economic burden of
prescription opioid abuse carried by the United States is estimated to be
$78.4 billion.17 Recognizing the magnitude of this problem, the United
States Department of Health declared the opioid crisis a public health
emergency.18
Communities began searching for someone to hold legally
accountable, and from the beginning, all eyes were fixed on the
pharmaceutical companies responsible for putting opioids on the

12. U.S. Opioid Dispensing Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html [https://
perma.cc/FC9Z-PD3J] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (noting an increase in the overall
national opioid prescribing rate starting in 2006 and peaking in 2012 at a rate of
more than 81.3 prescriptions per 100 persons).
13. Prescription Opioids DrugFacts, supra note 9.
14. Data and Statistics About Opioid Use During Pregnancy, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/opioids/
data.html [https://perma.cc/D9JR-8RBW] (last visited July 16, 2021).
15. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome results when infants are exposed to
opioids in the womb. Withdrawal symptoms in babies include excessive crying,
trembling, seizures, unstable temperature, sweating, and poor feeding and
sucking. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, STANFORD CHILD.’S HEALTH,
https://www.stanfordchildrens.org/en/topic/default?id=neonatal-abstinencesyndrome-90-P02387 [https://perma.cc/Z4FZ-YUDJ] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
16. See Geoff Mulvihill, Opioid Victims Can Begin Filing Claims Against
Purdue Pharma, ABC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020), https://abc3340.com/news/nationworld/opioid-victims-can-begin-filing-claims-against-purdue-pharma
[https://perma.cc/9HAS-HDHR] (sharing the story of Dede Yoder, a mother who
spent her whole retirement savings, approximately $200,000, on doctors’
appointments and rehabilitation centers before losing her 17-year-old son to an
opioid overdose).
17. Opioid Overdose Crisis, supra note 11 (explaining that the economic
burden of prescription opioid misuse includes the costs of healthcare, lost
productivity, addiction treatment, and criminal justice involvement).
18. Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/opioid6jul2020.aspx [https://perma.cc/3265-P95G] (last visited July 13, 2020).
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prescription market.19 Initially, families, on behalf of their lost loved ones,
and individuals suffering from opioid abuse disorder filed suits against
opioid manufacturers alleging defective design, failure to warn, and
misrepresentation of product dangers.20 Most of these individual suits
were dismissed on summary judgment because of powerful defenses
asserted by manufacturers.21 Plaintiffs reacted by attempting to use class
action suits.22 Ultimately, most of these suits were unsuccessful due to
procedural barriers that persist today.23 As a result, mothers like Cory’s
and broken families across the nation were denied justice for their loved
ones.24
In 2018, however, the tides turned when the federal government and
thousands of plaintiffs including states, counties, and Native American
tribes filed suits against the leading figures in the pharmaceutical drug
industry.25 The government plaintiffs sought redress for their debilitated
social institutions and the massive amounts of funds expended on treating
the opioid epidemic, including damages for lost productivity, health
insurance, criminal justice, and substance abuse treatment.26 Most of the
19. See Rebecca L. Haffajee, & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies
Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, 377 N. ENGL. J. MED. 24 (2017).
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex.
2006); Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Franz v.
Purdue Pharma Co., No. 05-CV-201-PB, 2006 WL 455998 (D.N.H. 2006); Price
v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So. 2d 479 (Miss. 2006); Freund v. Purdue Pharma
Co., No. 04-C-611, 2006 WL 482382 (E.D. Wis. 2006). It is difficult to persuade
a jury that a pharmaceutical drug is defectively designed when it is approved by
the Food and Drug Administration. In addition, most states recognize the learned
intermediary doctrine as a defense available to manufacturers, which provides that
a manufacturer’s duty to warn is limited to warning prescribers, while prescribers
are responsible for disclosing risks to patients. Furthermore, juries are sometimes
persuaded by the argument that intervening factors, such as prescribing practice
and patient behavior, contribute to the injury and thus preclude juries from holding
manufacturers liable. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 19.
22. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 19.
23. See id. Certifying a class action requires a sufficient degree of similarity
across claims, issues, and defenses that is often difficult to satisfy in mass tort
cases. Judges are more likely to deny class certification where the factual and legal
issues of liability differ between class members so dramatically that
individualized questions overwhelm questions common to the class. See RICHARD
L. MARCUS ET AL., COMPLEX LITIGATION 343–47 (6th ed. 2015).
24. See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 19.
25. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375,
1379–80 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
26. Id. Suits were also filed in state courts across the country.
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federal cases were handled through multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the
Northern District of Ohio, and settlement negotiations were promising.27
Following an influx of lawsuits, however, some pharmaceutical
companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, placing an automatic stay on
all pending and future litigation across the country.28
Mass tort litigation presents significant obstacles to resolution.29 As
exemplified by the opioid litigation, mass tort cases involve complex
causation issues, high transaction costs, and numerous distinct classes of
victims.30 Typically, the judicial system relies on three main procedural
devices to resolve mass tort litigation: (1) class actions, (2) multidistrict
litigation, and (3) bankruptcy proceedings.31 Procedural rules have
important effects on litigation outcomes, and unfortunately, no system has
proven to be flawless.32
Adding to these complexities, a common defense strategy has emerged
among mass tort defendants in attempts to regain control of litigation.33
Mass tort defendants are increasingly invoking Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings to escape unfavorable litigation.34 The incentives for this
practice are clear: the bankruptcy process offers significant and unique
advantages to defendants facing enterprise-threatening liability that are not
available elsewhere.35 A closer look at the method, however, reveals
several problems.36 First, defendants are exploiting statutory loopholes in
the Bankruptcy Code to bind both current and future claimants to
settlement agreements while simultaneously discharging themselves from
any future liability.37 Second, reliance on Chapter 11 as a means for
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-23649, 619 B.R. 38 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2019); In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-11292 (Bankr. D. Del. filed
June 10, 2019); In re Mallinckrodt Plc., No. 20-12522 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct.
12, 2020).
29. See William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order
Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995).
30. See id.
31. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, 53 GA. L. REV.
2 (2019) [hereinafter Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation].
32. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., APPENDIX C: MASS TORTS
PROBLEMS & PROPOSALS: A REPORT TO THE MASS TORTS WORKING GROUP 8–
22 (1999).
33. See generally Samir D. Parikh, The New Mass Torts Bargain FORDHAM
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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resolving mass tort litigation is misplaced, and the goals of aggregate
litigation are better served by MDL than bankruptcy.38 This shift is
significant; although the bankruptcy system undoubtedly offers some
advantages to mass tort resolution, the system harbors many drawbacks as
well.39 This Comment argues that MDL is the superior option for resolving
mass tort disputes.
This Comment begins by illustrating the complexities of mass tort
cases that threaten the ability to achieve comprehensive resolution. Part I
emphasizes that the very nature of mass tort litigation precludes resolution
that is focused solely on individualized justice. Part II of this Comment
surveys the evolution of aggregative systems for mass tort resolution, from
its class action origins to its modern posture in MDL and Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings. Part III of this Comment contends that there is an
emerging trend among corporate defendants to escape traditional litigation
by filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This Part argues that the abusive use
of bankruptcy power is problematic because it accrues mostly to the
benefit of corporate defendants. Further, this Part posits that MDL is a
superior device for resolving mass tort litigation. Finally, Part IV proposes
that Congress should revise the Bankruptcy Code to close statutory
loopholes and to disincentivize the misuse of bankruptcy power by
corporate tortfeasors. Part IV concludes by suggesting that Congress
should enact specific legislation that reflects a higher standard for entering
Chapter 11 proceedings to prevent bad faith filings, while ensuring that
the bankruptcy forum is available to legitimate, good-faith defendants.
I. MASS TORT LITIGATION
For decades, the American judicial system has grappled with the fair
and efficient resolution of mass tort liability.40 A mass tort involves
hundreds to thousands of victims injured by the harmful acts of one or
more defendants.41 Historically, mass injuries have been attributable to

38. See generally WILLGING, supra note 32, at 8–22.
39. See Parikh, supra note 33; see also Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass
Torts in the Bankruptcy System, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1622, 1663 (2008).
40. See Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving EnterpriseThreatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000).
41. See id.
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toxic exposure,42 products liability,43 and disaster.44 The sheer volume of
claims sharing common issues and actors distinguishes mass torts from
ordinary civil litigation.45
A. A Glance at the History of Mass Torts
Mass tort litigation has become more prevalent over the last 50 years,
overwhelming court dockets and disrupting industries.46 In the 1970s, a
mass tort case emerged when thousands of United States Military veterans
developed a variety of cancers as a result of exposure to the herbicide
Agent Orange.47 The veterans and their families sued the chemical
42. See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710
(E.D.N.Y. 1991).
43. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789, 790 (E.D.
La. 2007); see also In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 611-MD2299, 2014 WL 2872299 (W.D. La. June 23, 2014).
44. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03-MDL-1570
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of
Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 963 (E.D. La. 2011); In re MGM
Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 570 F. Supp. 913 (D. Nev. 1983).
45. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass
Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 965
(1993).
46. From June 2004 to June 2005, per federal judgeship, there were 532
actions filed, 480 pending actions, 522 terminations, and 19 completed trials. The
median duration of civil actions from filing to trial was 22.9 months. From June
2018 to June 2019, per federal judgeship, there were 599 new actions filed, 682
actions pending, 634 terminations, and 17 completed trials. The median duration
of civil actions from filing to trial was 27.2 months, with 16.1% of cases being
over three years old. See U.S. CTS., FED. CT. MGMT. STAT.: U.S. DIST. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile063
0.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ATR5-F2C6] (last updated on June 30, 2020). In the
context of multidistrict litigation (MDL) in particular, the number of actions
transferred to an MDL as tag-alongs from 1973 to 2019 has increased by
approximately 5,206.96%. See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEAR SUMMARY OF JPML ACTIVITY
3–6 (1973–2019), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calen
dar_Year_Statistics-2019_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM2P-7USR]; see also
Hensler & Peterson, supra note 45, at 964 (“Lawyers, judges, and business
executives no longer wonder whether or not there will be another mass tort, but
rather what the next mass tort will be.”).
47. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); see also Alexis Abboud, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
(1979–1984), THE EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 4, 2017),
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manufacturers of Agent Orange, and after five years of litigation, the
parties agreed to a $180 million settlement.48 The 1970s also marked the
beginning of the asbestos litigation, the country’s “longest-running mass
tort litigation.”49 The litigation arose as a result of individuals’ exposure
to asbestos, which causes slowly manifesting and sometimes fatal
diseases.50 In the 1990s, mass products liability litigation ensued when the
attorneys general of 46 states sued the tobacco industry’s leading
manufacturers for deceptive marketing practices and concealing the
addictive properties of nicotine.51 The states sought recovery for the costs
incurred to support citizens suffering from chronic, smoking-related
illnesses.52 The tobacco litigation ended with the so-called master
settlement agreement, which was recognized as “the largest redistribution
of the costs of corporate wrongdoing” to date.53
The early 2000s witnessed a pair of mass disasters: the terrorist attacks
of September 11th and the BP oil spill.54 After the terrorist-orchestrated
airplane crashes of September 11, 2001, injured parties and their family
members filed thousands of lawsuits, pitting victims’ families and sick
https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/re-agent-orange-product-liability-litigation-19791984 [https://perma.cc/QQ89-Y8FH]; U.S. DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AGENT
ORANGE, https://www.va.gov/disability/eligibility/hazardous-materials-exposure
/agent-orange/ [https://perma.cc/ZW9H-4B2B] (last updated Sept. 18, 2020)
(“Agent Orange was a tactical herbicide in the U.S. military used to clear leaves
and vegetation for military operations mainly during the Vietnam War.”).
48. According to the veterans’ lawyers, “[t]he award was the largest ever won
by a class of claimants who sued for wrongful injury.” See Ralph Blumenthal,
Veterans Accept $180 Million Pact on Agent Orange, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1984,
at A1.
49. Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation, RAND CORP., 2005,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG162.html [https://perma.cc/HJA9ASRW] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
50. Id.
51. See generally Gregory W. Taylor, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered
Smokers, and the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1081, 1095–96 (2010); see also Allison Torres Burtka, The Tobacco Cases:
Taking On Big Tobacco, AM. MUSEUM OF TORT LAW (June 13, 2016),
https://www.tortmuseum.org/the-tobacco-cases/ [https://perma.cc/R89H-G4NB].
52. See generally Taylor, supra note 51, at 1095–96.
53. Id.
54. See Chris Francescani & Scott Michels, Who Should Pay for 9/11?, ABC
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2009, 12:10 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=357
9255&page=1 [https://perma.cc/7WRF-32YF]; see also Reuters, BP 2010 Oil Spill
Settlement: A Timeline of Litigation, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/news
/us-news/bp-oil-spill-settlement-timeline-litigation-n385736
[https://perma.cc/G6VR-CMLT] (last updated July 3, 2015, 1:41 AM).
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disaster-relief workers against airlines and the United States government.55
With billions of dollars at stake, Congress established the “September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund” to settle individual claims for injuries and
deaths caused by the terrorist attacks and the debris removal efforts
following the disaster in exchange for surrendering the right to file future
lawsuits.56 Then, in 2010, the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded, killing 11
workers and releasing “millions of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of
Mexico.”57 Individuals and businesses adversely affected by the
Deepwater Horizon incident filed actions against BP—the multinational
oil and gas firm responsible for the spill—for the loss of money and
property, resulting in a $7.8 billion class action settlement.58 The federal
government and several states also litigated against BP for five years
before reaching an $18.7 billion settlement—the “largest settlement with
a single entity in U.S. history.”59 More recent mass tort litigation involves
Big Pharmaceutical’s opioids;60 Monsanto’s Roundup;61 Juul Labs’ e-

55. See Francescani & Michels, supra note 54.
56. See Serving the 9/11 Community for Decades to Come, SEPT. 11TH
VICTIM COMP. FUND, https://www.vcf.gov [https://perma.cc/Y9PP-N5R7] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2020) (“The signing of the ‘Never Forget the Heroes, James
Zadroga, Ray Pfeifer, and Luis Alvarez Permanent Authorization of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Act’ in July 2019, fully funded the
VCF to pay all eligible claims and extended the claim filing deadline to October
1, 2090.”).
57. See Reuters, BP 2010 Oil Spill Settlement: A Timeline of Litigation, supra
note 54.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 2804, 290 F. Supp.
3d 1375, 1379–80 (J.P.M.L. 2017); In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-23649, 619 B.R.
38 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019); In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-11292 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2019). More than 2,400 local and state governments filed lawsuits seeking
to hold leading pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors liable for the opioid
epidemic plaguing their constituencies. See Colin Dwyer, Your Guide To The
Massive (And Massively Complex) Opioid Litigation, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/10/15/761537367/your-guide-to
-the-massive-and-massively-complex-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/2HZFQGQ4].
61. In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F. Supp. 3d 1346 (J.P.M.L. 2016).
Thousands of individuals filed lawsuits against Monsanto, the manufacturer of the
herbicide Roundup, after contracting non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma because of
exposure to the chemical. Id.
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cigarettes;62 and sexual abuse cases within USA Gymnastics,63 the
Catholic Church,64 and Boy Scouts of America.65
B. Problems Posed by Mass Tort Disputes
The magnitude and complexity of mass tort litigation presents
challenges to fair and efficient resolution for all parties involved.66 Mass
tort litigation is difficult to resolve because of (1) high transaction costs
and delays; (2) complex factual and legal issues; (3) latent injuries and
unidentifiable victims; and (4) the need for some semblance of finality.67
1. Costs and Delay
A principal problem posed by mass tort litigation is that because of the
sheer volume of claims, it is expensive and time-consuming for the parties
and courts.68 One factor contributing to the high transaction cost is the
repetition of discovery and adjudication for the same factual and legal
issues.69 Thousands of cases filed across the country means that the
defendant must pay expenses associated with being brought into thousands
62. In re Juul Labs, Inc. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Lit., 396 F. Supp.
3d 1366 (J.P.M.L. 2019). Consumers and government entities filed lawsuits
against Juul Labs, Inc., the e-cigarette manufacturer controlling 75% of the ecigarette market, alleging deception and misrepresentation for failing to disclose
the dangerous chemicals in their products. Clifford Law, Vaping – The Next Wave
of Lawsuits, X NAT’L L. REV. 266 (2020).
63. See In re USA Gymnastics, No. 18-09108, 2020 WL 1932340 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 2020). Hundreds of gymnasts filed lawsuits against U.S.A. Gymnastics
for sexual abuse endured by the victims from a former team doctor and team
coaches. Id.
64. See, e.g., In re Archdiocese of New Orleans, No. 20-10846, 2021 WL
454220 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2020); In re Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis,
No. 15-30125, 553 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016). The New Orleans
Archdiocese is the most recent branch of the Catholic Church to file for
bankruptcy protection as a result of hundreds of sexual abuse lawsuits against the
clergy. In re Archdiocese of New Orleans, 2021 WL 454220.
65. Thousands of survivors of childhood sexual abuse pursued claims against
Boy Scouts of America for failing to protect them from abusive leaders. See In re
Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-10343, 2021 WL 1820574 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
66. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 8–22; see also Schwarzer, supra note
29, at 837–38.
67. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 8–22; see also Schwarzer, supra note
29, at 837–38.
68. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 15.
69. See id.
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of different courts and litigating the same issues time after time.70
Moreover, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial affords all litigants
their own day in court.71 As a result, hosting thousands of trials and ruling
on thousands of motions not only increases the cost to defendants, but also
increases the time and labor of the courts.72 These increased delays
preclude many victims from obtaining relief and increased costs unfairly
prejudice defendants.73
Furthermore, a massive influx of cases—in addition to alreadyencumbered federal dockets—precludes any practical resolution of mass
torts on an individualized basis.74 To illustrate, from June 2018 to June
2019, there were 599 new actions filed, 682 actions pending, 634
terminations, and 17 completed trials per federal judgeship on average.75
The median duration of civil actions from filing to trial was 27.2 months,
with 16.1% of cases being over three years old.76 Clearly, federal dockets
are already inundated.77 Further, in the mass tort sphere, the Vioxx
litigation alone involved over 30,000 litigants.78 Similarly, the pelvic mesh
litigation against seven leading medical device manufacturers
encompassed over 100,000 claims.79 With the exorbitant amount of claims

70. See Schwarzer, supra note 29, at 837.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. U.S. CTS., FED. CT. MGMT. STAT.: U.S. DIST. CTS., https://www.us
courts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0630.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DTN-4N4P] (last updated on June 30, 2020).
75. In comparison, from June 2004 to June 2005, per federal judgeship, there
were 532 actions filed, 480 pending actions, 522 terminations, and 19 completed
trials. The median duration of civil actions from filing to trial was 22.9 months.
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Lit., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La.
2007); see also Matthew Goldstein, As Pelvic Mesh Settlements Near $8 Billion,
Women Question Lawyers’ Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/02/01/business/pelvic-mesh-settlements-lawyers.html [https://
perma.cc/RRK7-339J]. Vioxx, the arthritis painkiller manufactured by Merck &
Co., caused at least 88,000 heart attacks and 38,000 deaths in users, spurring
approximately 66,000 personal injury cases across the country. See Kristin
Compton, Vioxx Lawsuits, DRUGWATCH, https://www.drugwatch.com/vioxx/
lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/E6RE-6Z6F] (last visited Nov. 10, 2020).
79. See Goldstein, supra note 78. Women across the country injured by the
transvaginal mesh implants initiated over 108,000 lawsuits against leading
medical device manufacturers. The claims alleged that the transvaginal mesh
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and claimants involved in mass tort suits, the multiple, potentially
duplicative adjudications result in increased costs and delays in the already
over-burdened federal dockets.80 Consequently, the inherent
characteristics of mass tort litigation serve as barriers to efficient
resolution.81
2. Complex Factual and Legal Issues
Another obstacle in mass tort litigation is that the novelty of some
injuries entails intricate causation issues, often in areas of limited scientific
knowledge.82 Generally, courts have handled mass torts involving discrete
disasters without substantial difficulty.83 Other mass torts, however, have
complex factual and legal issues, and consequently, pose much more
complicated questions for courts.84 This is because “most potentially toxic
substances” do not have “a solid body of epidemiological evidence” for
support.85 Thus, it is difficult for scientists to know for certain whether a
particular substance is the cause of a certain harm.86 In effect, scientific
uncertainty leads to legal uncertainty, as questions of causation that are
difficult for scientific experts to answer are likely difficult for generalist
judges and juries to answer as well.87
Adding to these complexities, not all mass torts are fungible.88
Plaintiffs must prove not only general causation but also specific
causation.89 In other words, a plaintiff must show both that the defendant’s
conduct is capable of causing the alleged harm and that the conduct was a
specific cause of a particular plaintiff’s injuries.90 Specific causation is
“frequently speculative” because of the scientific uncertainty regarding the
caused severe complications such as “pain, bleeding, infection, organ perforation,
and autoimmune problems.” See Michelle Llamas, Transvaginal Mesh Lawsuits,
DRUGWATCH,
https://www.drugwatch.com/transvaginal-mesh/lawsuits/
[https://perma.cc/4KUV-PT9J] (last modified Nov. 4, 2020).
80. See Schwarzer, supra note 29, at 837.
81. See id.
82. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 10.
83. Examples of discrete disasters include “aircraft crashes, building
collapses, and train wrecks.” See generally Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of
Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1821, 1826 (1994).
84. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 314–15 (1996).
85. Id.
86. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 11.
87. See id.
88. See generally McGovern, supra note 83, at 1821–22.
89. See Schwarzer, supra note 29, at 838.
90. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 11.
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harm of potentially toxic substances.91 This uncertainty and speculation of
causation results in either overinclusive or underinclusive outcomes to the
detriment of both parties.92 Hence, complex factual and legal issues create
another impediment to resolving mass tort litigation.93
3. Future Injuries and Unidentifiable Claimants
Some mass tort cases involve injuries that are temporally dispersed
over long periods of time.94 In other words, some injuries may not present
themselves immediately after an event or an exposure. These elastic mass
tort cases create “long latency period[s] between a person’s use or
exposure to a harmful [substance] and the . . . manifestation of harm.”95
Elastic mass torts produce four different classes of claimants: present,
identifiable, unidentifiable, and future unidentifiable.96 First, present
claimants are those “who have been exposed and have already developed
some illness.”97 Second, identifiable claimants are “those who know that
they have been exposed but do not yet show signs of illness.”98 This class
of claimants is aware of the risk of future illness or can learn of that fact,
“but they do not presently know that they will develop symptoms, when
such symptoms will occur, or to what degree of severity” the symptoms
may prevent themselves.99 Third, unidentifiable claimants are those who
have been exposed, but do not know of the exposure because their injuries
have not yet manifested.100 Lastly, future unidentifiable claimants are
those “who have not yet been exposed but may be exposed in the
future.”101 This class does not merely have unmanifested injuries; rather,
the claimants are unknowable because they have the potential to be
exposed at some point in the future.102

91. See id. at 11 n.29.
92. See Schwarzer, supra note 29, at 838.
93. See id.
94. See Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why, and
The How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93 (2004).
95. See Resnick, supra note 40, at 2045.
96. See Vairo, supra note 94, at 31–32.
97. See id. at 31.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. In Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court called this class
of unidentifiable claimants an “unselfconscious and amorphous” group. 521 U.S.
591, 628 (1997). See also Vairo, supra note 94, at 31–32.
101. See Vairo, supra note 94, at 31.
102. See id.
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Mass tort disputes implicating claimant classes three and four are
particularly problematic for resolution. First, as a constitutional matter,
federal courts may only exercise jurisdiction over cases and
controversies.103 One essential and unwavering element of the case-orcontroversy requirement is that parties have standing to sue.104 Standing
requires that a plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct.105 Accordingly, at the time a suit is
brought, those who have not yet been exposed, or who have been exposed
but have not yet manifested injuries, may not have standing to sue because
they lack a concrete injury-in-fact.106 Although these claimants cannot
participate in the suit, mass tort settlements and judgments attempt to
account for these classes of claimants so that they may recover once their
injuries materialize.107 The reality, however, is that funds are usually
depleted by the time their injuries materialize, thus substantially limiting
and potentially precluding anyone other than “present” claimants from
recovering their share.108 The Agent Orange litigation, for instance,
provides a vivid illustration of this problem.109 In that case, some
individuals exposed to the chemical remained asymptomatic for as long as
33 years.110 Thus, when the Agent Orange litigation commenced, these
individuals had no indication of injuries from their exposure—rendering
them unidentifiable victims.111 By the time the victims’ cancer manifested,
however, the $170 billion settlement had run out of funds, and the victims
had no recourse.112 Still today, mass tortfeasors often have limited assets
available to compensate victims.113 Accordingly, latent injuries and
unidentifiable victims pose significant problems for defendants’ ability to
predict the extent of potential claims and adequately compensate present
and future claimants with available funds.114

103. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
104. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
105. See id.
106. See Samantha Y. Warshauer, When Futures Fight Back: For LongLatency Injury Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, Are Asymptomatic
Subclasses the Cure to the Disease?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1219 (2004).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
110. See Warshauer, supra note 106, at 1219.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 18.
114. See id.
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4. Need for Finality
Finality is a central goal of litigation and is desired by all.115 Mass tort
defendants seek to make “global peace,” legally foreclosing all, or nearly
all, of the claims in the subject area of the litigation as a whole.116 The
incentive is to reconcile all claims to remove the threat of mounting and
indefinite litigation.117 Plaintiffs also benefit from comprehensive
resolution because they receive closure from prosecuting their claims.118
Furthermore, the judicial system benefits by resolving disputes that would
otherwise linger indefinitely in court.119 Yet the complexities inherent in
mass tort litigation often inhibit litigants from the benefit of final peace.120
The sheer volume of claims means that there is no natural termination to
the litigation.121 This concern is magnified by elastic mass tort cases that
present unidentifiable future victims, as the injuries and the claimants
develop successively over a long period of time.122 Thus, achieving finality
is a challenging goal in mass tort litigation.123
C. Rough Justice
Traditionally, the justice system has focused on individualized case
treatment.124 In the context of mass tort litigation, however, it is impossible
to try each claim as its own separate case.125 The federal judiciary is

115. See id. at 20–21.
116. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT
219 (2007).
117. See Morgan A. McCollum, Local Government Plaintiffs and the Opioid
Multi-District Litigation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 942 (2019) (defining global peace).
118. See WILLGING, supra note 32, at 20–21.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See generally id. at 19–21; Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, supra
note 31, at 15.
123. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89
GEO. L.J. 371, 372 (2001) (“In complex class actions, defendants purchase a
commodity—finality. They buy from the plaintiffs’ representative the plaintiffs’
rights to sue.”); see also WILLGING, supra note 32, at 20.
124. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 45, at 961, 964.
125. See ALEXANDRA D. LAHAV, ROUGH JUSTICE 2–3 (2010), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1562677 [https://perma.cc/872R-6
MCA] [hereinafter LAHAV, ROUGH JUSTICE].
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inundated with cases.126 Attempting to provide “individualized justice” to
such large-scale disputes risks overwhelming the judiciary and preventing
some victims from receiving any justice at all.127 The pressures on the
judicial system created by mass torts have rendered comprehensive
aggregation procedures—such as class actions, MDL, and bankruptcy
proceedings—“a logical, if not an indispensable, method” for enforcing
the law and righting widespread wrongs.128 These aggregative systems
provide a vehicle for victims whose claims involve smaller losses that
could not realistically be pursued alone.129 This means, however, that some
form of “rough justice” is not only warranted, but necessary.130
II. MODERN AGGREGATIVE SYSTEMS
There are three main aggregative systems for resolving mass tort
litigation: (1) the class action; (2) multidistrict litigation (MDL); and
(3) bankruptcy proceedings.131 Although each embodies distinct
procedural tools and limitations, these systems share a common objective:
to foster the efficient and fair resolution of large-scale disputes.132 These
systems facilitate resolution in ways other than by a trial; namely by
alternative dispute resolution, settlement, or pretrial disposition.133 Class
actions, multidistrict litigation, and bankruptcy were traditionally
considered to be three separate “phenomena.”134 Now, however, scholars
understand the systems as forming a “continuum” that allows parties to
experiment with each and avail themselves of whichever form quickly
results in settlement.135
126. U.S. CTS., FED. CT. MGMT. STAT.: U.S. DIST. CTS., https://www.us
courts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0630.2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WLV5-A3DM] (last updated on June 30, 2020).
127. See LAHAV, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 2–3.
128. Schwarzer, supra note 29, at 839.
129. See Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, supra note 31, at 15.
130. See LAHAV, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 2–3 (explaining that
“rough justice” is “the attempt to resolve large numbers of cases by using
statistical methods to give plaintiffs a justifiable amount of recovery”).
131. Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, supra note 31, at 2.
132. Id. at 12.
133. See LAHAV, ROUGH JUSTICE, supra note 125, at 2–3. Most frequently,
mass tort cases are resolved by some form of aggregate settlement. See
NAGAREDA, supra note 116 (“[T]he endgame for mass tort dispute is not trial but
settlement.”); Howard M. Erichson, A Typology of Aggregate Settlements, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1769 (2005).
134. Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, supra note 31, at 2.
135. Id.
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A. The Demise of Mass Tort Class Actions
In 1966, Congress promulgated the modern class action to combat
civil rights injustices by providing “global peace subject to judicial
approval.”136 The class action is a suit in which the court allows one person
or a small group of people to represent the interests of a larger group.137
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outline the conditions for certifying
a class action.138 Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) sets
forth four prerequisites for class certification, which are widely referred to
as “numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.”139 In addition to satisfying Rule 23(a), a case must also
comport with at least one of the categories detailed in Rule 23(b), which
include “limited fund” class actions,140 “injunctive or declaratory relief”
class actions,141 and “common question” class actions.142
Although the language of Rule 23 seems straightforward, the
certification of class actions for mass tort cases is rare.143 The Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure ’s notes to Rule 23 include a
warning stating that mass torts are “ordinarily not appropriate for a class
action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of
damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present,

136. Id. at 3; see McCollum, supra note 117, at 942 (explaining that “[g]lobal
peace means that a settlement legally forecloses all, or close to all, current and
future litigation against the defendants through claim preclusion”); see also
Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, supra note 31, at 2.
137. Class Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
138. The court must first certify a class in order for the action to proceed as a
class action. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 214.
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 200. The
elements of Rule 23(a) are:
(1) numerosity: the class must be so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) commonality: there are questions of law
or fact common to the class; (3) typicality: the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) adequacy of representation: the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Oplchenski v. Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 489, 492 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(internal citations omitted).
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 267–85.
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 285–99.
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 299–362.
143. ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM
BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 12 (2019).
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affecting the individuals in different ways.”144 Some committee members
opposed mass tort class actions because of victims’ “loss of individual
liberty” and the ability of counsel to bind victims that were not parties to
the suit.145 Over the years, a few mass tort class actions managed to
surface.146 Nevertheless, following a line of cases that can be interpreted
as a judicial reaction against the excessive use of mass tort class actions,
mass tort cases seldomly receive class certification today.147
In the 1990s, two Supreme Court decisions abruptly halted the practice
of mass tort class actions.148 Both cases involved a mass of asbestosrelated personal injury claims against asbestos manufacturers.149 In
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court struck down the parties’
proposed settlement agreement, which attempted to use Rule 23(b)(3)150
to certify a settlement-only class encompassing potentially millions of
current and future class members.151 Essentially, the proposed settlement
class included all four types of mass tort claimants—present, identifiable,
unidentifiable, and future unidentifiable claimants—all of which would be
automatically bound to the settlement trust fund and precluded from
pursuing their own claims, unless they chose to opt out of the class.152 The
Court overturned the mass tort settlement for two significant reasons.153
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
145. Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as
a Class Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711, 1719–21, 1726 (2017)
(internal quotations omitted) [hereinafter Bradt, Something Less and Something
More].
146. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987) (certification of classes over military-contractor defenses); see also, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (certification of classes
over state-of-the-art defenses).
147. See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 23, at 343; see also BURCH, supra note
143, at 15.
148. BURCH, supra note 143, at 13; see Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
149. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598; see also Ortiz, 527 U.S. 815.
150. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598. A class may be maintained if it satisfies
Rule 23(a) and if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
151. BURCH, supra note 143, at 13; see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598.
152. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598–607; see also David Marcus, The Short Life
and Long Afterlife of the Mass Tort Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1575
(2017).
153. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619–28.
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First, the Court expressed concern about the disparate treatment across
victim classes, as the proposed class limited the defendants’ liability
concerning absent class members that did not participate in the suit.154 In
particular, the court noted that individuals with current injuries want
sufficient, immediate payments, but that goal is in tension with the
interests of absent plaintiffs in ensuring an adequate, protected fund for
the future.155 The Court emphasized that the settling parties’ failure to
include any assurances of fair and adequate representation for the
divergent class interests rendered representation inadequate.156 Secondly,
the Court determined that the proposed class could not meet Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.157 Specifically, the number of
questions unique to each class of claimants regarding the nature of injury,
causation, damages, and affirmative defenses predominated over any
questions common to the class.158 Accordingly, the Amchem decision
demonstrates that the nature of personal injury mass torts makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy the requirements of adequate
representation and predominance necessary to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class
action.159
In Ortiz v. Fibreboard, the Supreme Court rejected another asbestos
settlement with features similar to those it disapproved of in Amchem.160
The proposition in Ortiz operated as a mandatory “limited fund”
settlement class certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).161 The defendant had
already settled 45,000 claims but sought a “Global Settlement” that would
bind present and future claimants.162 The Court denied class certification
of the claimants, noting the presence of the same deficiencies that
pervaded the settlement-only class in Amchem.163 Specifically, the

154. BURCH, supra note 143, at 13; see Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–28.
155. BURCH, supra note 143, at 13; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–28.
156. BURCH, supra note 143, at 14; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–28.
157. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623–25.
158. Id. (endorsing the Third Circuit’s rationale that “[c]lass members were
exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time,
in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members suffer no
physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer
from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma. . . . Each has a
different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation
inquiry.”).
159. See id.
160. See BURCH, supra note 143, at 14.
161. See id; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 825–28 (1999).
162. See BURCH, supra note 143, at 14; see also Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 823–25.
163. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 848–58.
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proposed class did not sufficiently protect the interests of future victims.164
Along with Amchem and Ortiz, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
forged even more rigorous standards for class certification.165
The Supreme Court decisions in Amchem and Ortiz have certainly
made it more difficult to resolve mass torts using Rule 23’s settlement
classes.166 As a result, litigants shifted to reliance on MDL and Chapter 11
bankruptcy to achieve global peace.167 Nevertheless, MDL only
exacerbates the concerns illuminated by mass tort class actions.168
Likewise, bankruptcy proceedings as a mechanism for mass tort resolution
also suffer from some of the deficiencies plaguing mass tort class actions
and MDL.169
B. Filling the Void with Multidistrict Litigation
MDL emerged partially as a reform for the restrictive characteristics
of Rule 23 class actions.170 Whereas representative plaintiffs file class
actions on behalf of a large group of class members, MDL cases maintain
their individuality but are consolidated and transferred to a single federal
court for a more efficient pretrial process.171 Congress established the
statutory authority for MDL when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to provide
a framework for consolidating a multitude of cases with factual similarities

164. See id. at 857.
165. See BURCH, supra note 143, at 15 n.31 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27,
34 (2013).
166. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions – Past, Present, and
Future, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1008 (2017) (“Overall, there have been very few
mass tort cases certified as settlement or other class actions over the nearly fiftyyear period during which mass tort class actions have been theoretically
available.”); see also BURCH, supra note 143, at 15.
167. See Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort
Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Action to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass
Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405–07 (1999).
168. See generally BURCH, supra note 143, at 15.
169. See infra Part III.
170. See Bradt, Something Less and Something More, supra note 145, at 1719–
21.
171. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating that “[o]ne or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members. . . .”); but
see 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (providing that “civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact . . . pending in different districts . . . may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”).

2022]

COMMENT

539

in the interests of justice, efficiency, and convenience.172 The statute
empowers the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to
centralize actions pending in various federal courts to a single district court
for coordinated pretrial proceedings.173 This seven-judge panel appointed
by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court determines MDL
status only by a concurrence of at least four judges and consent of the
transferee district.174 Centralization may be initiated either sua sponte by
the JPML or upon motion by one of the parties.175 Thereafter, the JPML
provides notice to all parties potentially affected by consolidation and
holds an evidentiary hearing where any affected party may offer evidence
supporting or opposing transfer.176
The threshold inquiry for transfer is whether the subject cases entail
complex, common questions of fact.177 Once this standard is satisfied,
cases are centralized and the transferee judge inherits the authority to
decide all pretrial motions, including dispositive motions.178 Actions filed
subsequent to MDL centralization may receive “tag-along” status and be
transferred to the MDL as well.179 Finally, § 1407(a) mandates that once
all pretrial matters have concluded, the JPML shall remand the remaining
individual cases back to their original courts for trial.180
Today, MDL is the dominant procedure for mass tort litigation.181 In
fact, as of September 15, 2020, 180 MDL dockets are pending across 44
transferee districts.182 Putting those numbers into perspective, 312,519 out
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
173. Id.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). The receiving court of the MDL—the court chosen
to conduct coordinated pretrial proceedings—is referred to as the “transferee
district.” Likewise, the presiding judge is referred to as the “transferee judge.”
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).
176. Id.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
178. Id. Claimants and defendants subject to transfer have no right to appeal a
transfer denial. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e). A party wishing to challenge a transfer
grant, however, may petition for an extraordinary writ in the federal circuit court
exercising jurisdiction over the transferee court. Id.
179. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
Rule 1.1(h), 199 F.R.D. 425, 427 (2001) (defining a “tag-along action” as “a civil
action pending in a district court which involves common questions of fact
with . . . actions previously transferred . . . under Section 1407”).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
181. See Jay Tidmarsh & Daniela Peinado Welsh, The Future of Multidistrict
Litigation, 51 CONN. L. REV. 771 (2019).
182. MDL Statistics Report – Distribution of Pending MDL Dockets by
District, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (Sept. 15, 2020),
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of 421,082 civil actions pending in federal district courts belong to
MDL.183 Although § 1407(a) requires individual remands at the
conclusion of pretrial matters, realistically, only about 2.9% of cases ever
return to their home courts.184 Some cases are dismissed by dispositive
motions, but the vast majority of MDL is resolved in settlement.185
Meanwhile, a trend is emerging whereby corporate defendants escape
MDL settlement negotiations by invoking Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code.186
C. Resolving Mass Torts in Bankruptcy Court
Widespread dissatisfaction with the management and resolution of
mass tort claims paved the way for other aggregative devices, like the
bankruptcy system, to intervene.187 The Bankruptcy Code did not
originally provide for its use as a mechanism for resolving mass torts.188
Yet, shortly after the Code’s inception, litigants uncovered bankruptcy as
a new aggregative device for resolving “seemingly intractable” mass tort
disputes.189 In particular, defendants facing multifarious asbestos-related
liabilities saw the potential for Chapter 11 to provide a centralized forum
and structured system for achieving global peace.190 As a result, Congress
reacted to asbestos defendants’ innovation and codified § 524(g), a set of
rules and protections for mass-tort-induced bankruptcies.191 Importantly
though, this section applies only to asbestos cases.192
1. Traditional Chapter 11 Reorganization
Finding its genesis in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Chapter 11
aims to preserve a corporate entity’s reorganization value over its

https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_Dis
trict-September-15-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRB7-W8E4].
183. Id.
184. See McCollum, supra note 117, at 942.
185. See Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 43 (1991).
186. See Parikh, supra note 33.
187. See Lahav, The Continuum of Aggregation, supra note 31, at 3.
188. Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y. L. REV. 960, 999 (2012).
189. See id.
190. Smith, supra note 39, at 1622.
191. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
192. Id.
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liquidation value.193 Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of
financially distressed business entities.194 The primary goals of
reorganization are to furnish the “equality of distribution to similar
creditors in a collective proceeding while ameliorating the devastating
effect that a huge liability may have on the worth of a business and . . . the
compensation available to all victims.”195 Bankruptcy is an attractive
device for mass tort resolution because of its central features of (1) forum
centralization; (2) pervasive jurisdiction; and (3) power of finality.196
A bankruptcy case commences with the filing of a petition, whether
voluntarily by the debtor or involuntarily by creditors.197 Technically,
insolvency is not a prerequisite to initiate a Chapter 11 case.198 Rather,
Chapter 11 imposes two good-faith requirements on the part of a debtor
seeking refuge in the protections of the Code.199 First, § 1129(b)(3) states
that a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization shall be “proposed in good faith
and not by any means forbidden by law.”200 The good faith requirement is
defined by the common law.201 Thus, standards differ depending on the
jurisdiction.202 Some courts require both objective futility and subjective
bad faith to be evident in order to warrant a bad faith dismissal, while other
courts only require evidence of either objective futility or subjective bad
faith.203 In addition, a second provision of the Code, § 1112(b)(4), sets
193. See JONES DAY, Comparison of Chapter 11 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (2007), https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/1ec093d466fb-42a6-8115-be0694c59443/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e5b465727aeb-4c34-ab2e-bee2f8f3d3c2/Comparison%20of%20Chapter%2011%20(A4)
.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6PT-NYV7].
194. 11 U.S.C. § 301.
195. Resnick, supra note 40, at 2050 (internal citations omitted).
196. McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1018.
197. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303.
198. See Mark G. Douglas, Two Circuits Examine Chapter 11’s Good Faith
Filing Requirement, JONES DAY (Jan./Feb. 2008), https://www.jonesday.com/en/
insights/2008/01/two-circuits-examine-chapter-11s-goodfaith-filing-requirement
[https://perma.cc/GN4W-FS7L].
199. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1112(b)(4), 1129(b)(3); see also Douglas, supra note
198.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3); see also Douglas, supra note 198.
201. See Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 1989).
202. See id.
203. In the case of In re Capitol Food Corporation of Fields Corner, the First
Circuit held that the “imminent or threatened foreclosure on the debtor’s interests
in real property essential to successful reorganization efforts” is precisely the kind
of financial distress contemplated by Chapter 11. 490 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
In contrast, in In re Premier Automotive Services, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held
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forth a list of circumstances giving rise to cause for dismissal of a Chapter
11 case or conversion to a Chapter 7 liquidation.204 Such instances include
the “continuing loss to or diminution of the estate,” the “inability to
effectuate . . . [a] plan,” or unreasonable delay by the debtor.205 Although
not explicitly listed in § 1112(b)(4), some courts hold that filing a Chapter
11 case in bad faith is cause for dismissal or conversion.206 To ensure the
debtor’s good-faith filing, debtors must file a statement of financial affairs,
a list of creditors, and a summary of assets and liabilities with the
bankruptcy court.207 In response, creditors may apply for the dismissal of
a debtor’s petition if it is perceived to be filed in bad faith.208
Once the petition is filed, and assuming it is not dismissed, the debtor
must submit for court approval a disclosure statement regarding the plan
of reorganization that sets forth “adequate information” to enable creditors
to make an informed judgment on the plan.209 Chapter 11 cases fall into
two main categories: a “pre-packaged” case or a “freefall” case.210 A
freefall case is the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization.211 In a so-called
pre-packaged case, the debtor and creditors participate in negotiations
prior to the filing for bankruptcy.212 The debtor engages in soliciting plan
acceptances before the reorganization plan is ever approved by the
that an absence of good faith requires a showing of both “objective futility” and
“subjective bad faith.” 492 F.3d 274, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2007). There, the court
dismissed the bankruptcy proceeding as having been filed solely to halt imminent
eviction proceedings. Id. at 285. Thus, the court found that the Chapter 11 case
was initiated in bad faith. Id. at 280. The Second Circuit holds that dismissal is
warranted if there is “no reasonable likelihood that the debtor intended to
reorganize and no reasonable probability that it would eventually emerge from
bankruptcy proceedings.” C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship v. Norton Co., 113 F.3d 1304,
1309 (2d Cir. 1997). The Third Circuit evaluates whether the petition serves a
valid purpose for reorganization or whether it was filed “to obtain a tactical
litigation advantage.” In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 120
(3d Cir. 2004).
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); see also Douglas, supra note 198.
205. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); see also Douglas, supra note 198.
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); see also cases cited supra note 203.
207. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b) (2015).
208. Id.
209. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1125.
210. Sandra E. Mayerson, Current Developments in Prepackaged Bankruptcy
Plans, 804 PLI/COMM 979, 981 (2000) (“The term prepackaged bankruptcy
applies to plans where the negotiations and solicitation of acceptance occurred
before commencement of a chapter 11 case.”).
211. See McKenzie, supra note 188, at 999.
212. See id.
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court.213 In the absence of a pre-packaged case, however, the court usually
must approve the disclosure statement before the debtor begins soliciting
plan acceptances or creditors begin soliciting plan rejections.214 For both
types, the debtor has 120 days from the time of filing to propose a plan of
reorganization, which may be extended 60 days by court order.215 The plan
of reorganization must (1) identify debts; (2) identify whether the creditor
claims are priority, secured, or general unsecured, and the number of
claims classified as each; (3) provide a determination of which debts will
be paid in full, and which debts will be repaid in a percentage amount; (4)
provide methods on how the debts will be paid; and (5) present guidelines
as to how the company will operate while implementing the plan.216
The plan of reorganization creates various classes of creditors based
on the substance of their claims but treats all members of a single class
equally to each other.217 The creditors can respond to the reorganization
plan at a disclosure hearing, and the plan may be negotiated and modified
as agreed to by the debtor.218 In order to accept a plan of reorganization,
creditors possessing impaired claims must vote by ballot to approve the
plan.219 To minimize holdout risk and to avoid abuse by the majority, an
entire class of claims is deemed to accept a plan when both creditors
holding two-thirds of the value of claims, as well as more than one-half of
the claims in number, accept the plan.220 Even if not all classes have
approved the plan, however, the court can invoke its “cram-down power”
to accept the plan as long as one class of creditors has approved it.221 Still,
the court must ensure that “the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is
fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.”222 Finally, once the
disclosure statement is approved and the ballots are collected, the
bankruptcy court conducts a confirmation hearing to determine whether

213. Id.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b)–(d).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)–(b).
217. See McKenzie, supra note 188, at 999.
218. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 1126. “Impaired” refers to those creditors whose contractual
rights are to be modified or who will be paid less than the full value of their claims
under the plan.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
221. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (internal citations omitted).
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the reorganization plan is feasible and whether the plan was proposed in
good faith and according to the law.223
2. Prepackaged Bankruptcy, Asbestos-Related Liability, and
§ 524(g)
In 1973, the Fifth Circuit ruled that plaintiffs harmed by exposure to
asbestos could hold manufacturers strictly liable for failure to warn of the
risks associated with asbestos.224 As a result, lawsuits against asbestos
manufacturers flooded the courts based on strict liability theories.225 One
asbestos manufacturer, the Johns-Manville Corporation (Manville),
became the first entity to use the bankruptcy court as a forum for resolving
mass tort liability.226
In the 1970s, Manville was the nation’s leading asbestos miner,
distributor, and manufacturer.227 By 1982, the corporation faced around
12,500 suits brought by over 16,000 claimants and an estimated $2 billion
in potential liability.228 Consequently, considering the massive amount of
personal injury liability that it would likely face in the future, Manville
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.229 The Manville plan of reorganization
included a feature now known as a channeling injunction.230 The function
of a channeling injunction is twofold.231 First, it channels all asbestos
claims to a litigation trust fund that serves as the only source of recovery
for claimants.232 Second, it issues an injunction on the filing of asbestos
personal injury claims against the reorganized debtor.233 Importantly, the
injunction applies to present and future claimants, unlike Rule 23(b)(3)
and MDL settlements.234 In fact, by binding absent claimants and freeing
223. 11 U.S.C. § 1128.
224. Borel v. Fibreboard, 493 F.2d 1076, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Carroll
et al., supra note 49.
225. By 2002, individuals filed approximately 730,000 asbestos claims. See
Carroll et al., supra note 49.
226. See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988); see
also Adam Paul et al., Resolving Mass Tort Liability Through Bankruptcy, 37TH
ANN. SE. BANKR. L. INST. (Apr. 14–16, 2011).
227. See Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639.
228. Marianna Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Personal
Injury Settlement Trust, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (1990).
229. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639.
230. See id.; see also Paul et al., supra note 226, at 18.
231. See Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
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debtors from any future liability, channeling injunctions accomplish
precisely what the Supreme Court prohibited in Amchem.235
Congress codified Manville’s channeling injunction in § 524(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code.236 Section 524(g) allows debtors’ reorganization plans
to enjoin future personal injury, wrongful death, and property damage
claims “seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence
of, or exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products.”237
Significantly, however, this section of the Code also imposes procedural
protections designed to ensure that future creditors receive the same
treatment as current creditors.238 Specifically, § 524(g) explains how the
trust must be funded and the specific findings that the bankruptcy court
must make before binding future claimants to the channeling injunction.239
First, § 524(g) requires that the trust be “funded in whole or in part by
the securities of 1 or more debtors involved in such plan and by the
obligation of such debtor . . . to make future payments, including
dividends.”240 This section further provides that the trust is to own a
majority of the voting shares of each debtor, its parent corporation, or a
subsidiary of each debtor.241 Second, in order for the channeling injunction
to bind future claimants, § 524(g) requires the bankruptcy court to make
the following findings: (1) the debtor is likely to be subject to substantial
future demands for payment arising out of the same or similar conduct or
events that gave rise to the claims; (2) the actual amounts, numbers, and
timing of such future demands cannot be determined; (3) pursuit of such
demands outside the procedures proscribed by such plan is likely to
threaten the plan’s purpose to deal equitably with claims and future
demands; (4) the plan is accepted by at least 75% of the class of claimants;
and (5) the trust will operate through mechanisms such as structured,
periodic, or supplemental payments, pro rata distributions, matrices, or
periodic review of estimates of the numbers and values of present claims
and future demands that provide reasonable assurance that the trust will be
able to support present and future demands in substantially the same
manner.242 Additionally, although the Code does not otherwise expressly
235. See supra Section II.A.
236. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
237. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
238. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (detailing funding requirements and
certain findings to be made by the bankruptcy court before applying the
channeling injunction to future claimants).
239. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
240. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II).
241. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III).
242. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I)–(V).
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authorize third-party releases, § 524(g) extends the injunction’s
protections beyond the debtor to release third parties that may be held
derivatively liable for the debtor’s conduct, such as affiliates, managers,
executives, or insurers.243 Again, the ability to write off third parties makes
declaring bankruptcy a superior avenue for defendants, rather than class
actions and MDL.244
Importantly, the channeling injunctions authorized by § 524(g) apply
only to asbestos-related claims in Chapter 11 cases.245 Thus, corporate
debtors in other mass tort cases must rely on another provision of the Code
to establish litigation trusts and channeling injunctions, specifically
§ 105.246 Because non-asbestos-related mass tort defendants are unable to
utilize § 524(g), these defendants instead appeal to the general equitable
powers of bankruptcy courts under § 105 to create channeling injunctions
that mimic those offered in § 524(g).247 Although, facially, asbestos and
non-asbestos defendants rely on two different sections of the code, in
theory, the effect is the same.248
III. THE EMERGING TREND: EXITING MDL AND ENTERING CHAPTER 11
Mass tort defendants are increasingly invoking Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceedings to escape unfavorable litigation, seeking to discharge their
current and future liabilities through channeling injunctions based on those
in § 524(g).249 The year 2019 marked an uptick in filings by non-asbestos,
mass tort debtors in particular.250 Recently, mass tort defendants involving

243. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii).
244. See Paul et al., supra note 226.
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (stating that a channeling injunction is
to be implemented pursuant to the reorganization plan of debtors named
defendants “in personal injury, wrongful death, or property-damage actions
seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure
to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products.” (emphasis added)).
246. See id.; see also Paul et al., supra note 226.
247. See 11 U.S.C. § 105; see also Paul et al., supra note 226.
248. See Paul et al., supra note 226.
249. See id.
250. See Mark D. Plevin & Tacie H. Yoon, A Look Back at Mass Tort
Bankruptcy Cases in 2019 – Asbestos and Beyond, CROWELL MORING (Jan. 22,
2020), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/A-Look-Backat-Mass-Tort-Bankruptcy-Cases-in-2019-Asbestos-and-Beyond [https://perma.cc/
D2SV-R6TH] (providing a chart of mass tort bankruptcies filed in 2019).
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Big Pharmaceutical’s opioids251 and sexual abuse cases within USA
Gymnastics,252 the Catholic Church,253 and Boy Scouts of America254 have
all filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the midst of extensive litigation. By
appealing to the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers under § 105, these
debtors have availed themselves of the benefits of § 524(g) without
complying with its restrictions.255
A. Chapter 11’s Allure
Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, corresponding
jurisdictional statutes, and a set of jurisprudential procedural tools, the
bankruptcy system offers mass tort defendants certain advantages that are
unavailable outside of bankruptcy.256 Chapter 11 is attractive to mass tort
defendants because of its power to achieve finality.257 Specifically, the
process provides closure to mass tort litigation by centralizing all claims
before the bankruptcy court, discharging the liabilities of the debtor, and
channeling future creditors to a trust from which claims are paid.258
Meanwhile, Chapter 11 gives financially distressed debtors time to
reorganize, revamp, and continue doing business so that the entity has the
chance to survive.259
One of the most critical aspects of the bankruptcy system is its ability
to resolve mass tort liability in a single, centralized forum.260 This
comprehensive resolution is accomplished through the bankruptcy court’s
expansive jurisdictional reach and the Code’s automatic stay.261 Section
157 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants the bankruptcy court the
authority to consolidate all claims before it that are “related to” the
251. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379–
80 (J.P.M.L. 2017); In re Purdue Pharma, No. 19-23649, 619 B.R. 38 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2019); In re Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 19-11292 (Bankr. D. Del. 2019).
252. See In re USA Gymnastics, No. 18-09108, 2020 WL 1932340 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 2020).
253. See, e.g., In re Archdiocese of New Orleans, No. 20-10846, 2021 WL
454220 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2020); In re Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis,
No. 15-30125, 553 B.R. 693 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2015).
254. See In re Boy Scouts of Am., No. 20-10343, 2021 WL 1820574 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2020).
255. See Parikh, supra note 33; see also Smith, supra note 39, at 1663.
256. See Paul et al., supra note 226.
257. See id.
258. See McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1004.
259. See JONES DAY, supra note 193.
260. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(5), 1334(b).
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
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bankruptcy proceedings.262 Likewise, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, the
district court enjoys “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under . . . or related to cases under Title 11.”263 The
Code grants bankruptcy courts such pervasive jurisdiction in order to
encourage the efficient and expeditious resolution of all matters affecting
the debtor.264 In the case of Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, the United States Third
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted “related to” jurisdiction broadly.265
The court articulated the standard as “whether the outcome of that
proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the estate being
administered in bankruptcy.”266
Another important aspect of Chapter 11 is the automatic stay.267 The
automatic stay is sweeping in scope; it halts almost all pending litigation
in federal and state forums.268 Upon the commencement of the bankruptcy
case, the stay immediately enjoins all actions and proceedings against the
debtor.269 The significance of the automatic stay is threefold: (1) it protects
corporate tortfeasors from collateral litigation; (2) it prevents creditors
from depleting assets before others have the chance to recover; and (3) it
eases consolidation efforts.270
Lastly, a significant benefit of Chapter 11 is the ability to discharge all
claims against the debtor.271 A confirmed reorganization plan becomes
“the governing document setting forth the treatment of the rights and
obligations of interested parties.”272 Through a channeling injunction, the
bankruptcy discharge impacts individuals beyond those involved in plan
confirmation; it is binding even on individuals who did not submit a proof
of claim in the process, whether they were aware of their status as
262. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
263. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
264. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc.
v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).
265. See Pacor, Inc., 743 F.2d at 994. The United States Supreme Court
endorsed the Pacor test in Celotex Corp., 514 U.S. 300.
266. See id.
267. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
268. Id.; see McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1004. However, the automatic stay
will not stop the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or
proceeding against the debtor, or the commencement or continuation of a civil
action or proceeding for the establishment of paternity, domestic support
obligations, child custody or visitation, or marriage dissolution. See Smith, supra
note 39, at 1639.
269. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); see McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1004.
270. See Smith, supra note 39, at 1639.
271. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1); see McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1004.
272. McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1006.
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claimants or not.273 A channeling injunction, modeled from the Manville
plan of reorganization, directs all present and future creditors to a litigation
trust and discharges the responsibility of the debtor, its related operating
entities, and its insurers.274 Consequently, any grievances that future
claimants may have must be reconciled by the trust, not the reorganized
debtor.275 In effect, channeling injunctions protect the debtor from the
threat of indefinite liability and give the debtor a “much stronger balance
sheet” upon emergence as a reorganized entity.276
B. Challenging Chapter 11’s Fitness for Mass Tort Resolution
The goals of aggregation are: “(a) enforcing substantive rights and
responsibilities; (b) promoting efficient use of litigation resources; (c)
facilitating binding resolutions of civil disputes; and (d) facilitating
accurate and just resolutions of civil disputes by trial and settlement.”277
These goals will inherently conflict, and no procedural device will prove
to be flawless.278 Yet, reliance on Chapter 11 as a means for resolving mass
tort litigation is misplaced.279 Although Chapter 11’s expansive
jurisdiction and automatic stay may appear to be more efficient and
convenient, surveying past mass tort bankruptcies reveals that its
efficiency is merely an illusion. The goals of aggregate litigation are better
accomplished through MDL than bankruptcy.280
1. Litigation Resources
Resolving mass tort disputes is an inherently costly and timeconsuming process.281 Bankruptcy cases are exceptionally expensive
because of the forced submission to the oversight of courts, committees,
and the U.S. Trustee.282 In Chapter 11 cases, attorneys’ fees are usually
billed on an hourly basis, the court filing fee is almost six times higher
than Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filings, and debtors in possession owe
273. See id.
274. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1988).
275. See McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1006.
276. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)–(ii); see also Paul et al., supra note 226.
277. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
§ 1.03 (2010).
278. See BURCH, supra note 143, at 15 n.31.
279. See generally Parikh, supra note 33.
280. See generally id.
281. See Paul et al., supra note 226.
282. See McKenzie, supra note 188, at 1010.
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quarterly fees to the United States Trustee’s Office while the case is
pending.283 In addition, the unfamiliarity with Chapter 11 terrain requires
professional services that carry immense costs.284 The debtor is
responsible not only for the expenses of its attorneys, accountants, and
professionals that it engages but also for the expenses of the official
committees appointed in the proceeding.285 Furthermore, the extensive
requirements of providing notice to creditors have the potential to create
“filing frenzies.”286 Especially in bankruptcy cases involving high-profile
media magnets such as Purdue Pharma and Boy Scouts of America, this
noticing process may provoke an influx of dubious claims or claims that
may have never been pursued but for the bankruptcy.287
Additionally, Chapter 11 is a long and arduous process.288 Initially,
bankruptcy appears to provide an efficient forum for resolving mass torts
because of its pervasive jurisdiction and comprehensive resolution in one
single forum.289 But such qualities do not necessarily guarantee the
expeditious resolution of claims.290 In fact, Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases
often result in significant delay of final disposition.291 Complex mass tort
cases are notorious for lingering in bankruptcy court for over six years.292
In part, the complexity of Chapter 11—with its disclosures, committees,
hearings, special accounts, audits, votes, and oversight by the United
States Trustee’s Office—makes the process extremely arduous.293 In
addition, the Code provides that for a period of 120 to 180 days the debtor

283. The initial fee charged by attorneys just for filing the case most often
exceeds $20,000. See Jonathon Petts, Chapter 7 vs. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in
2020: The Truth, UPSOLVE, https://upsolve.org/learn/chapter-7-vs-chapter-11explained/ [https://perma.cc/P598-KHDY] (last updated Oct. 20, 2020).
284. See Paul et al., supra note 226.
285. These committees can include “the official committee of unsecured
creditors, it may also include an equity committee, a funded debt committee, and
any other committee necessitated by the constituents in a particular case.” See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See Vairo, supra note 94, at 27.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988)
(lasting six years); In re Dow Corning Corp., 211 B.R. 545 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1997) (lasting nine years).
293. See More About Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, IN CHARGE DEBT SOLUTIONS,
https://www.incharge.org/bankruptcy/chapter-11/ [https://perma.cc/SX8N-WQRZ]
(last visited Feb. 8, 2022).
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has the exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.294 This
exclusivity period is routinely extended in complex mass tort-induced
bankruptcy cases.295 The exclusivity period in conjunction with the
automatic stay allows a debtor to “comfortably continue its business
without fear of displacement by its creditors or competing plans of
reorganization.”296 While these mechanisms are designed to quickly
resolve all claims, in reality they create a privilege that shifts the process
in the debtor’s favor and diminishes claimants’ leverage for settlement.297
In contrast, MDL tends to resolve relatively quickly.298 In re Vioxx
Products Liability Litigation, for example, reached a global settlement in
only two years.299 Despite encompassing over 20,000 claims, Judge Fallon
used a combination of discovery orders, bellwether trials, and coordination
with the judges and attorneys presiding over state cases to facilitate a
global settlement.300 Furthermore, because MDL provides an efficient,
collective resolution of mass tort claims by streamlining pretrial
proceedings, both litigants and the judicial system save resources.301
Often, transactional costs would be too high for individuals to pursue
claims on their own.302 Importantly, through MDL, lower transactional
costs allow the redress of wrongs that could not otherwise be righted.303
2. Facilitating Global Settlement
In mass tort disputes, the endgame is global settlement.304 While both
MDL and Chapter 11 proceedings have the power to facilitate global
settlement, MDL does so more efficiently and fairly to all victim classes.305
Whereas MDL judges assume the role of active case managers, bankruptcy
294. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b)–(d); see also Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 435.
295. See Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 441.
296. See id. at 435.
297. See id.
298. See Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex
Litigation If a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008).
299. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. La. 2007).
300. Id.
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000).
302. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation
Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 913 (2017) [hereinafter Bradt, A Radical
Proposal].
303. See id.
304. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION & FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, TEN STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION TRANSFEREE JUDGES (2d ed. 2014).
305. See Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 435.
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courts engage in lax oversight.306 Bankruptcy judges neither participate in
settlement negotiations nor scrutinize attorneys’ fees like MDL judges.307
Transferee judges tend to play an active role in overseeing settlement
negotiations and compelling party participation.308 The majority of federal
courts agree that public policy favors settlement of mass tort disputes.309
Indeed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that “facilitating
settlement” is one purpose of a pretrial conference.310 Perhaps the most
significant advantage that the MDL court has in facilitating settlement is
flexibility.311 Largely unrestricted by procedural rules, MDL judges have
developed a host of creative means for encouraging settlement.312 Such
measures include: (1) selecting liaison and steering committees;313 (2)
appointing magistrate judges or special masters to aide case
management;314 (3) conducting bellwether trials;315 (4) issuing special
orders;316 (5) coordinating with attorneys in state cases;317 and (6) using
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.318
Transferee judges appoint a number of attorneys to serve as lead
counsel and sit on steering committees to collaborate in managing the
litigation.319 The court holds regular status conferences with lead counsel
and committees, providing the judge with an opportunity to gauge the
parties’ progress in achieving the proceedings’ objectives and to help to
306. See Vairo, supra note 94, at 31–32.
307. See id.
308. Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All:
Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of Procedural
Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 129 (2015).
309. Sherman, supra note 298, at 2205.
310. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(A)(5).
311. Bloch Judicial Institute, Guidelines and Best Practices for Large and
Mass-Tort MDLs, DUKE L. SCH. (Sept. 2018), https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2018/09/MDL-2nd-Edition-2018-For-Posting.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/UV25-5E2P].
312. See BURCH, supra note 143.
313. Redish & Karaba, supra note 308, at 109.
314. Bloch Judicial Institute, supra note 311.
315. See Melissa J. Whitney, Bellwether Trials in MDL Proceedings, FED.
JUD. CTR. & J.P.M.L. (2019), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/19/
Bellwether%20Trials%20in%20MDL%20Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG
2U-XUNP].
316. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict
Litigation, YALE L.J. 64, 65 (2019) [hereinafter Burch, Nudges and Norms].
317. See Sherman, supra note 298, at 2205.
318. See id.
319. Redish & Karaba, supra note 308, at 109.
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ensure that the court and all counsel are informed of significant
developments.320 In addition, transferee courts test the merit of claims
early in the litigation by utilizing case-management orders such as plaintiff
fact sheets.321 Fact sheets require plaintiffs to produce information about
their claims from the outset and are crucial to any settlement
discussions.322 Indeed, settlement negotiations are often delayed because
the parties do not have enough information to assess the potential merit
and value of individual claims.323 Importantly, requiring plaintiffs to verify
their claims at an early stage in the litigation addresses any concerns that
MDL proceedings encourage unsubstantiated claims.324
A third method of promoting global settlement is through the use of
“bellwether trials.”325 While § 1407(a) limits the transferee court’s
authority to pretrial matters only, the court may conduct trials of cases
originally filed in the transferee’s district and cases in which the parties
waive objections to venue.326 Transferee judges schedule bellwether trials
in order to produce information about outcomes and claim values that
assist the parties in negotiating a global settlement over the remaining
claims.327 In effect, bellwether trials provide momentum to settlement.328
Another way transferee courts encourage settlement is by issuing a variety
of special orders.329 Sometimes, the mere threat of remand will spur
settlement.330 Lone Pine orders, which require plaintiffs to offer an expert
report proving that the defendant’s product or device caused their injuries,
also help the court weed out frivolous claims and further encourage
settlement.331 Moreover, even without a formal order, transferee judges’
express approval or disapproval is often enough to seal the settlement
deal.332 Litigants respect and defer to judges, so judicial endorsements are
highly influential.333
320. Bloch Judicial Institute, supra note 311.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See Whitney, supra note 315.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.
329. See Burch, Nudges and Norms, supra note 316, at 64–65.
330. Bloch Judicial Institute, supra note 311.
331. Lone Pine orders serve as case management orders that require plaintiffs
to provide evidence to substantiate causation allegations or the extent of injuries.
See Burch, Nudges and Norms, supra note 316, at 64–65.
332. See BURCH, supra note 143, at 99–101.
333. See id.
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Another means of encouraging the parties to settle is by appointing a
special settlement master to preside over negotiations.334 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53 authorizes settlement masters to order the parties to
meet for the purpose of engaging in meaningful settlement negotiations
and to make recommendations to the court concerning the resolution of
issues required to facilitate settlement.335 Thus, settlement masters occupy
many roles during litigation such as mediator, negotiator, subject matter
expert, discovery manager, and judicial advisor.336 Courts frequently
appoint settlement masters to supervise settlement negotiations that
require specialized knowledge or expertise that would otherwise be too
time-consuming for a judicial officer.337 Finally, MDL judges encourage,
and often order, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms to
prompt settlement.338 Such mechanisms include summary jury trials,
mandatory court-annexed mediation, mandatory non-binding arbitration,
and mini-trials.339 Notably, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
published a guide for MDL recommending the transferee judge to
“encourage an early mediation process” always keeping “the endgame in
mind.”340
3. Accuracy and Fairness
A significant problem in aggregate litigation is “balancing the
persistent need for efficient processing of claims in a system that relies on
litigation for enforcement of rights with the foundational American norms
334. See BURCH, supra note 143, at 101 (noting that Judge Woodlock
appointed a special settlement master in the Fresnius GranuFlo litigation, and
lead plaintiffs’ attorneys conceded that “having the imprimatur of the Court on
this settlement, especially given the number of claims,” will make things “go more
smoothly”). In In re Zimmerman Durom Hip Cup Products Liability Litigation,
where plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of a faulty hip replacement device, the
transferee judge stayed the MDL proceedings, ceasing all discovery efforts,
bellwether trials, and remands, and required plaintiffs to enter into a private
settlement program for 18 months or until they settled. See In re Zimmerman
Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-cv-04414 (D.N.J. May, 13, 2016); see
also BURCH, supra note 143, at 102.
335. FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
336. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the
Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 395–98 (1987).
337. See id.
338. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION & FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, supra note 304.
339. Id.
340. Id.
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of individual participation and a day in court.”341 The problem of future
victims created by elastic mass tort litigation frustrates efforts to develop
permanent solutions. The principal concern regarding future claims is the
right to due process. The right to proper notice and an opportunity to be
heard are pillars of the U.S. Constitution. Discharging future
unidentifiable claimants “to whom meaningful individualized notice
cannot be given and who cannot actually appear in the case” implicates
due process concerns.342 Indeed, “it is a drastic thing to cut off the rights
of persons who are not parties”—especially those who are not even aware
of their potential to be parties.343 Congress addressed the issue of
discharging future claims by codifying the Manville trust scheme in
§ 524(g).344 Under this section, the appointment of a legal representative
is required in order to protect the rights of those who may subsequently
assert a future demand.345 As previously mentioned, however, § 524(g)
only mandates the future-claims representative for purposes of asbestosrelated injury claims.346 In other words, there are no statutory safeguards
to ensure this protection in other mass tort bankruptcies that produce
channeling injunctions under § 105.347
Despite the fact that mass torts in MDL are typically resolved by
settlements, individuals have the choice to opt in to a settlement or to
demand to litigate individually.348 Unlike a bankruptcy proceeding, absent
victims are not bound by MDL settlements.349 Each plaintiff retains their
individual identity, their chosen representation, and their chosen forum, as
each case remains governed by the law of its original forum.350 In effect,
MDL preserves the traditional “norms of individual and decentralized
control” embodied in American litigation, while simultaneously avoiding
delay caused by repetitive rulings.351 Thus, MDL balances the tensions
between efficiency and retaining litigant autonomy—one important
consideration that bankruptcy fails to adequately address.352

341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.

Bradt, A Radical Proposal, supra note 302, at 913.
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i); see Vairo, supra note 94, at 31–32.
See Bradt, Something Less and Something More, supra note 145, at 1721.
11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).
Id.
Id.
Bradt, A Radical Proposal, supra note 302, at 914.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Section III.B.3.
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One of the most troubling implications for mass tort victims in
Chapter 11 proceedings is that the bankruptcy process “systematically
undercompensates tort creditors.”353 The primary reason tort victims are
often undercompensated in bankruptcy proceedings is that their claims are
subordinated to the claims of secured creditors.354 By filing for Chapter 11,
defendants increase the recoveries of secured lenders at the expense of tort
victims.355 This creates a substantial risk of insolvency that tort victims are
forced to bear.356 Ultimately, tort victims end up with token recoveries
regardless of the severity of harm underlying their claims.357 Meanwhile,
the defendant is able to satisfy all of its debts, relieve itself from future
liability, and restructure into a new entity.358 Positioned last in line for
recovery, tort claimants’ only leverage is their ability to vote against the
debtor’s plan of reorganization, which is “worth little in practice.”359
The bankruptcy process also suffers from a deficient system for
valuing and estimating claims.360 The debtor’s total liability must be
established in order to create a successful Chapter 11 reorganization
plan.361 Under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor estimates its “contingent,
unliquidated debt,” and the bankruptcy court has original jurisdiction over
the estimation proceeding.362 This estimation process, however, is “not a
trial on liability or an award of specific damages to individuals.”363 Rather,
claims are estimated primarily for voting on the reorganization plan and
for determining its feasibility.364 The bankruptcy court is not authorized to
hold a jury trial nor does the Code require that there be an actual trial
before plan confirmation.365 The bankruptcy system is accustomed to
providing an administrative process that relies on the parties to reach a
consensual resolution.366 As a result, bankruptcy’s truncated adversarial
proceeding means that mass tort victims with distinct injuries may be

353. Vincent S.J. Buccola & Joshua C. Macey, Claim Durability and
Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem, 38 YALE J. ON REG. 766 (2021).
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. Id.
360. See Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 442.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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grouped together.367 In the same vein, some creditors may be unfairly left
out of their appropriate class.368 The effects of producing such
overinclusive or underinclusive classes are significant, as the
reorganization plan treats all members of each class equally to the
members of its own class for purposes of recovery.369 Accordingly, there
is a possibility that mass tort claimants may not receive the compensation
they deserve.
Furthermore, bankruptcy courts do not scrutinize the plan of
reorganization as closely as district judges presiding over class action and
MDL negotiations and settlements.370 Judges review class action
settlements to ensure fairness of the negotiation process and resulting
settlements.371 Similarly, MDL transferee judges take an active role in
settlement negotiations.372 In contrast, bankruptcy courts in Chapter 11
cases preside over the estimation process and evaluate plan feasibility
during the confirmation hearing yet are absent from plan negotiations.373
The only time bankruptcy courts engage in a fairness inquiry is in the event
that the creditors cannot agree on a plan and the court invokes its cramdown power.374 This lack of judicial scrutiny further tilts the bankruptcy
process in favor of mass tort defendants and discourages meaningful
settlement efforts.375
IV. AMENDING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Congress created MDL specifically for resolving mass tort litigation
unsuitable for resolution through class action and bankruptcy.376 Mass tort
defendants should be disincentivized from abandoning MDL unless there
is a legitimate need for reorganization. Amending the Bankruptcy Code to
provide for a strict reorganization-legitimacy standard is the first step
toward this goal. Nevertheless, for the necessary mass tort-induced
bankruptcies, the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to extend the
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Vairo, supra note 94, at 27.
370. See Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 455.
371. See id.
372. Redish & Karaba, supra note 308, at 129.
373. See Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 455–56.
374. See id. at 437. The Code’s “cram down” provision allows the bankruptcy
court to accept a plan of reorganization even over the objection of some claimant
classes. See discussion infra Section II.C.1.
375. See Rice & Davis, supra note 167, at 455–56.
376. See BURCH, supra note 143.
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provisions protecting asbestos-related cases to all cases involving elastic
torts and latent injuries.
A. Proposed Legislation Requiring a Legitimate Showing of the Need for
Reorganization
The purpose of Chapter 11 is to provide honest, financially distressed
debtors with a new beginning.377 To protect this privilege, the Bankruptcy
Code requires good faith by the debtor when petitioning the court.378 The
standard for good faith varies by jurisdiction.379 Some courts require both
objective futility and subjective bad faith to be evident in order to warrant
a bad faith dismissal, while other courts only require evidence of either
objective futility or subjective bad faith.380 In order to disincentivize
corporate tortfeasors from invoking Chapter 11 protections solely for the
purpose of escaping MDL, a precise standard for good-faith must be
incorporated into the Bankruptcy Code.381 The Bankruptcy Code should
be amended to provide for a mandatory inquiry into the legitimacy of the
entity’s need for reorganization. Further, the inquiry should occur at the
outset of the proceeding, once the petition is filed, rather than upon a
creditor’s showing or after the proposal of a reorganization plan. The
bankruptcy court should be required to conduct a more critical analysis
than the good faith inquiry that merely asks whether the proceeding was
filed with good intentions and with the expectation of reorganization.
Specifically, the standard should test the legitimacy of the Chapter 11
filing by asking whether the debtor’s potential tort liability both threatens
the continuing vitality of the entity and substantially exceeds the debtor’s
ability to compensate all present and future creditors. Further, the standard
should mimic the Third Circuit’s test regarding whether the petition serves
a valid purpose for reorganization or whether it was filed “to obtain a
tactical litigation advantage.”382 This legitimacy standard will encourage
only good faith filings and deter defendants from relying on bankruptcy as
an easy “out.” In effect, only entities with legitimate reorganization
concerns will enter Chapter 11 proceedings, and such entities will be more
inclined to cooperate with creditors, rather than to stall reorganization
negotiations.
377. See JONES DAY, supra note 193.
378. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(3); 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4); see also Douglas,
supra note 198.
379. See Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 1989).
380. See id.
381. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(3); 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4).
382. In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2007).
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B. Legitimate Reorganization Facing Elastic Mass Tort Liability Should
be Subject to the Provisions of § 524(g)
Once mass tort defendants’ Chapter 11 filings satisfy the legitimacy
standard, then § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) should be extended to encompass all
mass tort bankruptcies involving elastic mass torts and latent injuries.383
Section 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) should be amended to provide:
(i) the injunction is to be implemented in connection with a trust
that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization(I) is to assume the liabilities of a debtor which at the time of entry
of the order for relief has been named a defendant in personal
injury, wrongful death, or property related actions seeking
recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or
exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products likely to
subject the debtor to substantial future demands allegedly caused
by the same or similar conduct that gave rise to the claims that
are addressed by the injunction.
There are two primary justifications for this change. First, Congress
enacted § 524(g) in response to the “seemingly intractable” asbestos
litigation.384 What makes the asbestos litigation seemingly intractable is
its elasticity, and that characteristic is not limited to asbestos alone.385
Harm caused by the presence of or exposure to asbestos implicates all four
victim classes.386 Similarly, other product liability, toxic-exposure, and
widespread-disaster mass torts involving latent harms also implicate all
four victim classes and, thus, are properly included in the proposed
statutory amendment.387
The opioid litigation illustrates this point.388 The harm inflicted by the
opioid epidemic is both temporally and geographically dispersed across
the country, affecting state and local governments and their citizens for the
last 40 years.389 The various injuries resulting from the harm range across
383. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
384. See McKenzie, supra note 188, at 999.
385. See id.
386. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
387. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also discussions supra Section I.B.3.
388. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379–80
(J.P.M.L. 2017); In re Purdue Pharma, Case No. 19-23649, 619 B.R. 38 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2019).
389. See id.
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all four victim classes. There are present identifiable victims that have
been harmed by Purdue’s conduct, such as the various states that bore the
costs of rehabilitating their citizens.390 Present identifiable victims also
include individuals like Cory Boland’s mother who exhausted her
financial means on rehabilitating her son.391 There are also future
identifiable victims such as the babies yet to be born who, upon birth, will
suffer from Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome as a result of their mothers
abusing opioids during pregnancy.392 Lastly, there are also future
unidentifiable victims such as babies who also have yet to be born but may
potentially be born with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome if their mothers
begin abusing opioids during pregnancy.393 Just as the opioid crisis
involves elastic torts and latent injuries, many mass tort injuries implicate
all four victim classes and manifest over long periods of time. Therefore,
all mass tort cases involving elastic torts, latent injuries, and enterprisethreatening liability that are subject to Chapter 11 reorganization should
be covered by the same protections as asbestos-related claims.394
CONCLUSION
Mass tort defendants are exiting MDL and entering Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings in an attempt to regain control of the litigation.395
Appealing to the bankruptcy court’s all-writs powers under § 105,
defendants are seizing the procedural advantages of § 524(g)—the
provision applicable only to asbestos-related tort claims.396 This trend is
problematic because defendants are selecting favorable features of
§ 524(g) without being subject to its restrictions.397 As the process stands,
Chapter 11 benefits mass tort debtors while disadvantaging creditors.398
Although the MDL framework is not flawless, it is the best available
option for resolving mass tort litigation.399 Nevertheless, Chapter 11 can
serve as an appropriate device for resolving mass tort liability only when
there is a legitimate need for reorganization. Therefore, the Bankruptcy
390. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d at 1379–80; In
re Purdue Pharma, 619 B.R. 38.
391. Boland, supra note 1.
392. Data and Statistics About Opioid Use During Pregnancy, supra note 14.
393. Id.
394. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I).
395. See Parikh, supra note 33.
396. See id.
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. See id.
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Code should be amended to reflect a stricter good-faith standard for
commencing a Chapter 11 case and to extend § 524(g)’s provisions to all
elastic mass torts that proceed through bankruptcy. Ultimately, these
amendments will disincentivize corporate tortfeasors from escaping MDL
and will facilitate efficient, fair, and conclusive mass tort resolution.

